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MILITARY EXPERIMENTATION
Time to Get Serious
Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.
In January 1929, the U.S. Navy undertook a major exercise known as FleetProblem IX, part of a series of exercises conducted by the service between
the two world wars. Despite the isolationist mood of America at the time, com-
pounded by tight budgets and arms control constraints, the Navy persisted in
conducting these exercises as, among other things, a means for determining the
influence upon sea power of continuing rapid advances in aviation technology.1
Fleet Problem IX took place off the coast of Panama. Present for the first
time in these fleet problems were two ships of radically new design—the air-
craft carriers USS Lexington (CV 2) and USS Saratoga (CV 3). During the ex-
ercise, Vice Admiral William V. Pratt, commanding the attacking force,
authorized Rear Admiral Joseph Reeves, commanding the Saratoga and a
light cruiser, to execute a high-speed run toward the
Panama Canal. Reeves then “attacked” the canal with
a seventy-plane strike force launched 140 miles from
the target.
Following Fleet Problem IX, Admiral Pratt observed,
“I believe that when we learn more of the possibilities of
the carrier we will come to an acceptance of Admiral
Reeves’ plan which provides for a very powerful and mo-
bile force . . . the nucleus of which is the carrier.”2 The fol-
lowing year, upon becoming Chief of Naval Operations,
Pratt directed that carriers be placed in offensive roles
in war games and fleet exercises. In such exercises,
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involving experimentation with new kinds of equipment, doctrine, and for-
mations, were sown seeds that brought forth the fast carrier task forces that
enabled the U.S. Navy to defeat the Imperial Japanese Navy during World
War II.
Eight years after Fleet Problem IX, on the north German plain, a new and
very different formation appeared in exercises conducted by the German
army: the panzer division. The panzer division was a combined-arms forma-
tion possessing large numbers of fast tanks with extended ranges; it was cen-
tered on a doctrine that called for rapid, deep penetration as a means to
achieve quick victory. This represented a dramatic departure from Germany’s
World War I experience against its principal enemy, France. That conflict had
been dominated by slow-moving forces employing heavy firepower and wag-
ing a war of gradual attrition.
In the 1937 German maneuvers, after a sixty-mile approach march, the pan-
zer division went into the attack, forcing the enemy to commit its reserves. The
following day the panzer division not only broke through the enemy front but
penetrated deep into its rear. The enemy position quickly became untenable,
and the issue was essentially decided only four days into what had been planned
as a seven-day exercise. General Franz Halder, who witnessed the spectacle (and
who would become chief of the General Staff a year later), was stunned by the
“fluid mobility” of the panzer operations.3
Many other exercises were conducted during the 1920s and 1930s by the
German military. They included experiments not only in mechanized warfare
but with radio communications schemes and the use of aircraft to provide re-
connaissance and close air support for rapidly moving ground forces. These
exercises were indispensable in enabling the German high command to develop
a devastating new form of land warfare known as blitzkrieg—lightning war.
Today, the U.S. military finds itself in a circumstance somewhat similar to
those that confronted the two military services mentioned above. As in the
interwar era, rapidly progressing technologies have emerged, creating a military
revolution (“revolution in military affairs,” in Pentagonspeak) that will produce
dramatic changes in the instruments of war and how military operations are
conducted. But as with naval aviation and mechanized ground operations sev-
enty years ago, it is not yet clear how this revolution will play out.
THE RISK OF STAYING ON OUR CURRENT PATH:
POWER PROJECTION
Despite all the uncertainties the U.S. military must confront in preparing for the
future, two things seem certain. First, the incentive is high for would-be adver-
saries to present the American military with challenges very different from those
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that confronted U.S. forces during the 1991 Gulf War. Second, the diffusion of
military technologies and the rapid progression of military-related technologies
will offer such adversaries the means to achieve this goal. Their prospects are
particularly good with respect to traditional power-projection opera-
tions, which form the core of the current U.S. two “major theater war” de-
fense posture.
This “two war” posture is founded on the nation’s ability to project power
rapidly and decisively to threatened regions around the globe. The Defense De-
partment’s last Quadrennial Defense Review, conducted in 1997, concluded that
“it is imperative that the United States now and for the foreseeable future be able
to deter and defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in
overlapping time frames.”4 Along these lines, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ’s vision
statement, Joint Vision 2010, declared that “power projection . . . will likely re-
main the fundamental strategic concept of our future force.”5
However, the U.S. military’s accustomed method of deploying and sustaining
air and ground forces at or through ports and airfields is almost certain to be
jeopardized by the growing proliferation of national and commercial satellite
services and of missile technology. Growing access to satellite services will allow
even rogue states to monitor U.S. deployments into forward bases and (unless
one makes heroic assumptions regarding the effectiveness of missile defenses)
hold them at risk through the employment of large numbers of ballistic and
cruise missiles. Senior U.S. military leaders have already voiced strong concern
over the nation’s ability to deal with such a contingency. General Ronald
Fogleman, when Air Force Chief of Staff, observed that
saturation ballistic missile attacks against littoral forces, ports, airfields, storage facili-
ties, and staging areas could make it extremely costly to project U.S. forces into a dis-
puted theater, much less carry out operations to defeat a well-armed aggressor.
Simply the threat of such enemy missile attacks might deter U.S. and coalition part-
ners from responding to aggression in the first instance.6
As Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jay Johnson expressed very similar
concerns when he declared,
Over the past ten years, it has become evident that proliferating weapon and infor-
mation technologies will enable our foes to attack the ports and airfields needed for
the forward deployment of our land-based forces.
I anticipate that the next century will see those foes striving to target concentra-
tions of troops and materiel ashore and attack our forces at sea and in the air. This is
more than a sea-denial threat or a Navy problem. It is an area-denial threat whose
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defeat or negation will become the single most crucial element in projecting and sus-
taining U.S. military power where it is needed.7
Perhaps most revealing, however, are the comments of a retired Indian briga-
dier general who observed that future access to forward bases
is by far the trickiest part of the American operational problem. This is the proverbial
“Achilles’ heel.” India needs to study the vulnerabilities and create covert bodies to
develop plans and execute operations to degrade these facilities in the run up to and
after commencement of hostilities. Scope exists for low cost options to significantly
reduce the combat potential of forces operating from these facilities.8
According to a recent Defense Science Board Study, development by a regional
power of this kind of anti-access capability by 2010 is certainly plausible, even
given the relatively severe resource constraints under which many third-world
militaries must operate.9 A commander in chief of U.S. forces in Korea has de-
clared that the problem of forward base access is not a problem for the U.S. mili-
tary of 2010 but one that exists in embryonic form in Korea today and will only
worsen over time.
As potential adversaries look for ways to deal with U.S. military preponder-
ance, they seem to have little inclination to create their own versions of the Iraqi
military as it existed at the time of the Gulf War. Iran, for example, seems far
more interested in fielding anti-access systems—such as ballistic and cruise mis-
siles, antiship cruise missiles, submarines, and advanced antiship mines—than
such military systems as tanks and combat aircraft that proved largely ineffective
for the Iraqis in 1991.
Assessing the emerging threats to U.S. power-projection forces, the National
Defense Panel unanimously agreed upon the need to “radically alter the way in
which we project power.”10 The panel concluded that the U.S. military must de-
velop the capability to execute the following missions (among others) within the
next decade: inserting and extracting forces in the absence of forward bases;
resupplying forward forces through airlift and sealift operations when access to
forward ports and airfields is at risk; seizing and controlling key terrain (includ-
ing urban areas) if friendly ground forces must operate dispersed; and achieving
air superiority against an enemy’s missile force.11
MILITARY EXPERIMENTATION: PAST AS PROLOGUE
In the coming years the U.S. military will likely encounter challenges very dif-
ferent from those it has faced in the past. There is enormous uncertainty, how-
ever, with respect to how it should position itself to deal with them. What
military systems, both existing and potential, will be needed? What prospective
operational concepts will prove effective, and which will not? Will new forms of
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military organization be required, analogous to the fast carrier task forces and
panzer divisions that transformed warfare in World War II? Will different kinds
of people possessing different skill sets than those in today’s force be needed?
These and other such questions require answers if America’s military is to play
its role in extending the post–Cold War era into a Long Peace.
Unfortunately, the answers to these questions are difficult to come by. More-
over, barring a dramatic increase in projected defense budgets, the Defense De-
partment will have to prepare for these challenges with roughly the resources
that it has today, and perhaps less. Simply
put, the Pentagon cannot afford to
“think rich” about preparing for emerg-
ing challenges; instead, it must “think
smart.” It cannot build a military for ev-
ery prospective threat, nor can it afford
to proceed with a modernization program that is oriented to meeting today’s
challenges but will prove ineffective against those that are emerging.
Yet the Pentagon may be doing precisely that when it undertakes large-scale
production of a new armored combat system, aircraft, or class of ships without
a good understanding of how the new weapon will compete against tomorrow’s
threats. For example, with respect to power projection, how does the Air Force
plan to deploy its new F-22 fighters to forward bases against the kind of theater-
denial forces described by General Fogleman, or to employ the fighter to achieve
air superiority against an enemy’s missile force? How does the Army plan to de-
ploy and sustain its heavy, digitized divisions in the absence of forward-base ac-
cess? How does the Navy plan to move its carrier battle groups safely through
narrow straits so as to influence the battle ashore, given that the range of the
F/A-18E/F carrier-based aircraft it is buying is inferior to that of the A-6 attack
aircraft being replaced? Or does the U.S. military need to begin fielding very
different kinds of systems, emphasizing different performance characteristics
(such as extended-range, precision, and stealth), as outlined in the report of
the National Defense Panel?12 Experimentation—at both the joint and service
level—provides an indispensable means for answering these questions and, in so
doing, for determining the mix of new and legacy (that is, existing) systems re-
quired to operate effectively against future threats.
Military experimentation is one of the keys to defense planning in an era of
high uncertainty and rapid technological change. Experimentation with inno-
vative operational concepts that employ emerging military systems and radically
new force structures has historically been an essential ingredient to preserving,
or gaining, advantages in military capability. For example, the twenty-one
large-scale fleet problems undertaken in the 1920s and 1930s were crucial to
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developing the principles, doctrine, trained personnel, defense-industrial base,
and systems mix that enabled the fast carrier task forces to supplant the
battleship-dominated fleet during World War II. Similarly, the numerous field
exercises conducted by the German military in that same time frame were indis-
pensable prerequisites to the highly coordinated, mechanized air-land forces
and operations that achieved the rapid conquest of France.
THE NEED FOR MILITARY EXPERIMENTATION
Military experimentation at the operational level (at which military campaigns
are waged) confers several critical benefits, both for defense planners and for
those concerned with fiscal accountability.
Reducing Uncertainty as to How Best to Meet Emerging Threats. Take the prob-
lem of projecting power in the absence of forward bases. Joint experimentation
would permit military leaders to try out different operational concepts for de-
ploying forces into a theater, conducting extended-range precision strikes, de-
termining whether achieving secured access to forward bases is feasible, and
deciding how to sustain the operation for a period sufficient to accomplish its
objectives. Through such experiments commanders can develop a far superior
feel for what operational concepts might succeed in such a threat environment,
and for the force mix and systems needed to support such operations. Equally
important, experimentation enables military leaders to identify force elements
and modernization plans that are likely to diminish in value over time. This
proved to be the case with the blitzkrieg; experimentation enabled the German
military to work through the coordination problems associated with fast-moving
mechanized formations, other ground formations, and supporting air units.
Determining the Proper Mix of Emerging and Legacy Systems. Experimentation
also assists military organizations in determining what new systems and capa-
bilities will be required, what legacy systems and capabilities should be sus-
tained, and what combination of the two should be established. The Germans,
for instance, used a series of exercises to experiment with different panzer-divi-
sion designs. They found their initial organization was far too “tank heavy” in
proportion to the other elements, such as artillery and engineers; consequently,
the number of tanks was reduced by 50 percent, and the proportion of certain
supporting forces (such as engineers) was increased. Finally, many supporting
elements were motorized to enable them to support the tanks’ rapid advances
better. In short, these exercises proved critical to the Germans’ ability to deter-
mine the proper mix of new (panzer, airborne, radio communications, re-
connaissance and attack aircraft) and existing (artillery, engineers, logis-
tics) capabilities.
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Creating Options for the Future. Experimentation that identifies new forms of
military operations and new force elements can permit the military to exercise
those options quickly when the threat emerges. For example, in the early
1960s the U.S. Army conducted extensive experiments to assess the potential of
air-mobile and air-assault operations. These experiments gave the Army an im-
portant option when, in the summer of 1965, it was ordered to send large forces
to Vietnam. The first division selected for deployment was the newly formed 1st
Cavalry Division (Airmobile). Similarly, the U.S. Navy that entered World II
was, first and foremost, a battleship navy. However, through its Fleet Problems
the Navy created the option of carrier-based operations, a capability that it
pursued quickly following Pearl Harbor.
Complicating the Planning of Would-Be Enemies. Importantly, experimenta-
tion that enables the U.S. military to “buy options” can also complicate the plan-
ning of potential adversaries. For example, in the 1930s the Imperial Japanese
Navy had to plan counters against a U.S. Navy that was exploring a range of op-
tions for naval aviation, including both large (Saratoga and Lexington) and small
(USS Ranger [CV 4]) carriers, the use of seaplanes, airships, and land-based
aircraft, and proposals for a class of “flying-deck” (partial flight-deck) cruisers.
By compelling a would-be adversary to stretch resources thin in order to cover
all possible options, or to concede that there are options for which it cannot pre-
pare a counter, experimentation can play an important role in dissuading other
militaries from entering into a competition in the first place.
Avoiding Legacy-Force Lock-In. Experimentation through war games, simula-
tions, and field exercises provides a means of avoiding the purchase of large
numbers of legacy systems under the assumption that since they are important
today, they will remain so for the foreseeable future. For example, German mili-
tary exercises led many senior leaders to conclude that horse cavalry had a very
limited future.
Avoiding False Starts. Experiments can help military organizations avoid “buy-
ing in” too early during a period of transformational change in military capabili-
ties. The U.S. Navy’s first carrier designed from the keel up, the Ranger, was
commissioned in 1934. Although some Navy leaders had pressed for construc-
tion of five Ranger-class carriers, game analysis and fleet problems soon indi-
cated that the Ranger, at roughly fourteen thousand tons, was far too small to
meet many of the demands of future fleet operations. As it turned out, the
Essex-class ships that formed the backbone of the Navy’s fast carrier task forces
in World War II displaced nearly twice as much tonnage.
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Avoiding Dead Ends. Military systems or capabilities that appear promising,
even revolutionary, sometimes fail to live up to their promise. In this case, the is-
sue is not to avoid “buying in” too early; rather, it is to avoid buying in at all.
Again, the experience of the U.S. Navy during the development of naval aviation
in the interwar period provides an example of how rigorous experimentation
and operational exercises can help avoid accumulating military capabilities that
lead not to transformation but to dead ends. In 1930 the Navy’s Bureau of Aero-
nautics proposed the construction of eight ten-thousand-ton flying-deck cruis-
ers. The ships—half cruiser and half flight deck—were subjected to war game
experiments at the Naval War College and to some experiments with surrogates
in the fleet. The results painted a distinctly unfavorable picture of the hybrid
ship, and it sank beneath the Navy’s programmatic waves, never to be heard
from again.
Identifying and Solving Practical Problems. Planning exercises and war games
can go only so far in identifying new forms of operations and system require-
ments. As with many things, the devil is in the details. For example, war games
conducted at the Naval War College in the early 1920s indicated the importance
of maximizing the aircraft complements and sortie rates of carriers.13 It was not,
however, until a prototype, the USS Langley (CV 1), was available that the Navy
could determine precisely how this goal was to be achieved. Under then-Captain
Reeves, the Langley conducted a series of experiments that led to such innova-
tions as crash barriers and the deck park, which enabled the ship to more than
double its aircraft complement and dramatically increase its sortie rate. Simi-
larly, the German army’s field exercises and operations in the late 1930s enabled
it to solve critical issues with respect to fuel and spare parts for its panzer forma-
tions and to determine how the German air force, the Luftwaffe, could provide
highly mobile reconnaissance and fire (close air) support. Experiments like
these were essential to both militaries’ efforts to transform to dominate emerg-
ing conflict environments.
EXPERIMENTATION: TIME TO GET SERIOUS
How well is the Defense Department doing in its efforts to secure the benefits
of experimentation to support its transformation efforts? To answer this, we
must assess how well the Pentagon’s efforts match the characteristics of suc-
cessful experimentation efforts in earlier periods of military transformation.
To succeed, a Defense Department experimentation initiative must reflect the
following characteristics.
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Vigorous
Experiments must be conducted on a frequent basis, and funding, forces, and
equipment (including prototype equipment and surrogates) must be made
available to support them. Unfortunately, the Defense Department leadership’s
rhetoric asserting the need for military transformation and experimentation has
not been matched by the requisite urgency or resources.
For example, the establishment of Joint Forces Command for the purpose of
undertaking joint experimentation was not a Defense Department initiative.
Rather, it was the consequence of congressional leadership and the recommen-
dations of an independent panel of experts.14 The Pentagon’s budget for Joint
Forces Command’s experimentation efforts stands at a meager forty-one mil-
lion dollars for fiscal year 2000. The Clinton administration’s request for FY
2001 was for forty-nine million. Such funding levels are at least an order of mag-
nitude lower than what is required to conduct vigorous and sustained field ex-
periments at the operational level. In 1999, for example, one service, the Air
Force, spent more than sixty million dollars—over 50 percent more than the
Joint Forces Command’s entire budget for joint experimentation—on one exer-
cise. According to the general in charge of JFC’s experimentation efforts, the
command is able, owing to funding shortages, to explore only half the
warfighting concepts it has identified.15 The first major exercise, or “major joint
integrating experiment,” is not scheduled to occur until 2004, some six years af-
ter the command was charged with the responsibility for joint experimentation.
This is not to say that a vigorous program of experimentation would neces-
sarily involve enormous sums of money. To be sure, it would probably involve an
investment of several billion dollars a year. However, the investment would be
relatively modest—less than 1 percent of the defense budget—while the payoff,
in terms of improved military effectiveness and efficiency, through avoiding
such funding sinkholes noted above as premature lock-in, false starts, and dead
ends, promises to more than justify it.
In any event, the current Defense approach to experimentation stands in
stark contrast to the sense of urgency that has historically characterized success-
ful military revitalization. Consequently, it is difficult to conclude the
department’s effort to date represents a serious intention to exploit the potential
of experimentation to support and inform military transformation.
Enduring
Experimentation must be an enduring element of what the U.S. military does, as
thoroughly institutionalized as forward-presence operations and training activ-
ities. Here certain services deserve credit for attempting to develop long-term
approaches to experimentation. The Marine Corps, for example, has sustained a
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series of exercises and experiments under the rubric of SEA DRAGON, which
includes HUNTER WARRIOR, URBAN WARRIOR, and CAPABLE WARRIOR. The Marines
apparently intend to pursue these experiments on an enduring basis, as a means
for preparing to meet emerging challenges while looking for ways to exploit ad-
vances in technology to support future operations.
The Marines also have explored innovative ways to surmount the lack of em-
phasis and resources accorded to such enterprises by senior Defense Depart-
ment leadership. For example, they have identified urban control and eviction
operations as being key elements of the post-transformation operational envi-
ronment. They immediately confronted the fact that the “combat towns” on U.S.
bases, while excellent for training small units in basic tactics, do not offer the
complexity or the communications interferences that real cities do. The Na-
tional Defense Panel recommended that a Joint Urban Warfare Center be estab-
lished for training and experimentation in an urban environment, but the
Defense Department declined to act. Absent such a facility, the Marines have
tried to conduct small-scale exercises in actual urban areas. One of their more
innovative efforts addresses the problem of close air support. In the absence of a
true urban-warfare training facility, the Marines commissioned the construc-
tion of an Urban Close Air Support Facility at their air station in Yuma, Arizona,
comprising 167 buildings constructed from shipping and cluster-bomb con-
tainers. The buildings of this jerry-rigged urban landscape range in size from
one to five stories and are configured in various shapes. In cases such as this, it
appears that experimentation is being sustained almost in spite of senior De-
fense Department levels.
Comprehensive
Experimentation must take place at all levels (tactical, operational, and stra-
tegic) of warfare, and also among all principal organizations involved, to in-
clude all the services and, where appropriate, other governmental and
nongovernmental elements. As asserted above, such experimentation implies a
level of effort on the part of the Defense Department that simply does not as yet
exist. To date, experimentation has been heavily weighted toward the tactical
level of warfare. While such experimentation is desirable, it must be in-
formed by how military organizations believe they will have to act at the op-
erational level.
For example, a recent Joint Forces Command simulation involved attacks on
critical mobile targets, such as self-propelled ballistic and cruise missile launch-
ers. However, the specifics of how the military might accomplish this task are
greatly influenced by considerations at the operational (and strategic) level.
Consider, for example, how the experiment’s conduct would change under the
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assumption that forward bases were either unavailable or had been placed at un-
acceptable risk (perhaps by the very missile forces that were the target of U.S. op-
erations). In sum, experimentation that focuses on the tactical level of warfare
without the context of the situation at the operational level risks arriving at ir-
relevant or impractical solutions.
Focused
Experimentation must be aimed squarely at the post-transformation challenges
and opportunities at the operational level of warfare. While experimentation
must be comprehensive, history indicates that its principal focus should be
meeting challenges—or exploiting
opportunities—at the campaign level.
Furthermore, experimentation
must be directed at preparing for
the next war, not at becoming more
proficient at waging the last. As we have argued, if these factors are not taken into
consideration, experimentation, no matter how vigorous, well funded, and en-
during, may arrive at some very good solutions to the wrong problems. This is
all too often the case with current experimentation.
Again, consider the recent simulation conducted by Joint Forces Command
on engaging critical mobile targets. It assumed the availability of forward bases
to support such operations, as was the case during the “Great Scud Hunt” of the
Gulf War. Similarly, the Air Force’s Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment 99 in-
volved the rapid forward deployment of an Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) to
fixed forward bases. This was done despite a growing chorus of military lead-
ers—including an Air Force Chief of Staff—and blue-ribbon expert advisory
groups cautioning that operating out of such bases will be a risky proposition
until enemy missile forces have been neutralized. Similarly, the Army, with its
emphasis on deploying a brigade to a forward base within ninety-six hours, may,
like the Air Force, find that its vision serves only to get itself to the enemy missile
ambush point (that is, a fixed forward base) more quickly.
On a brighter note, the Marines, through experiments like HUNTER WARRIOR,
are attempting in a small way to confront post-transformation challenges at the
operational level: “How do we sustain our forces in a world that will feature fewer
and fewer overseas land bases and where a large build-up of supplies and equip-
ment ashore may be impractical because of geographical, political, or threat con-
ditions?”16 The Navy’s Fleet Battle Experiment “Foxtrot,” which explored maritime
operational concepts in an area-denial threat environment, is a significant step in
the right direction. The Air Force has taken some positive, albeit small, initiatives
as well. In 1995–96 it sent three specially created AEFs to unimproved airfields in
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Bahrain, Jordan, and Qatar. For its part, the Army has war-gamed the forward-basing
problem (although it has not yet conducted experiments based on the insights its
games produced regarding the anti-access challenge). These are modest steps, to be
sure, but ones that could be encouraged by a comprehensive Defense Department
effort to exploit experimentation in support of transformation.
Both Service-Level and Joint
The U.S. military plans to fight as a joint force, one that draws upon all the
services’ capabilities. This makes sense, as modern technology has enabled each
of the services to operate far outside its traditional battlespace—and into the
battlespaces of the other services. Joint experimentation should therefore en-
courage a spirited, though friendly, competition among the services to deter-
mine the proper mix of capabilities. To its credit, the Army has sought to expand
the major exercise on urban operations it planned for September 2000—now
known as the Joint Contingency Force Advanced Warfighting Experiment, or
MILLENIUM FORCE 2000—to include participation from the other three services
as well as the staff of Joint Forces Command. Once again, this represents a
bottom-up approach by the services, as opposed to top-down encouragement
from senior Defense Department leaders.
Certainly, there are operations or campaigns that one service may dominate,
such as antisubmarine warfare, long-range precision strike, and space control.
Here, service experimentation might assume primacy over joint experimenta-
tion. However, given current and projected technology trends, such cases at the
operational level will likely become increasingly rare.
Exploited in Developing Future Requirements
It goes almost without saying that the insights and lessons derived from experi-
mentation must be harvested if innovation and transformation are to succeed.
Focusing on post-transformation challenges and opportunities helps to ensure
that the military is addressing the right questions with respect to future warfare
and thus can get the right answers with respect to emerging requirements. These
insights mean little, however, unless they actually influence the way require-
ments are determined, budgets are shaped, resources are allocated, institutions
are adapted, and forces are developed.
At present it is unclear how this is to be accomplished. Even if one assumes a
robust level of service and joint experimentation focused on emerging chal-
lenges, it is not clear how the insights will be translated into new requirements.
As one senior general officer has put it, “You fund these things and do an experi-
ment and you find out great things, but then [do] you have to wait another two
years or so before you get it into the normal budget process?”17
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Indeed, in recent years both the Defense Department’s Planning, Programming
and Budgeting System and the Joint Chiefs’ Joint Requirements Oversight Council
(with its “joint warfighting capabilities assessments” approach) have seemed in-
capable of effecting significant changes in service budget shares or in program
focus, despite the declared determination of Secretary of Defense William S. Co-
hen to transform the U.S. military.18 Promising new capabilities or force ele-
ments—such as unmanned combat aerial vehicles, moving-target-indicator
satellites (such as Discoverer II), the arsenal ship, Strike Force, the Deep-Strike
Brigade, the STREETFIGHTER littoral operational concept, and the Trident SSBN
conversion to conventional missile carriers—have been terminated, delayed, or
jeopardized. Yet support for such programs as modernizing tactical air and
heavy divisions continues unabated, even though it is far from clear these
would fare well in an anti-access power-projection environment.
If the Defense Department is to meet emerging challenges in such a way as to
preserve the current level of national security, it will have to effect significant
changes in its approach to military experimentation; specifically, it will have to
increase dramatically the priority accorded to experimentation. At present, the
department’s effort is poorly focused and severely underfunded. The potential
gains to be expected from a properly directed and funded experimentation ef-
fort are clear. To see the payoff of successful military transformation, and, by ex-
tension, the importance of a well-designed program of experimentation, one
has only to look at how the blitzkrieg upset the military balance in Europe and
how the U.S. Navy’s fast carrier task forces turned the tide in the Pacific during
World War II. The potential costs of continuing along the current path are clear
as well. They include investing in false starts and dead ends, arriving at the right
solutions to the wrong threats, and perhaps ultimately paying a price in jeopar-
dized security interests, national treasure wasted, and the lost lives of young
American men and women in uniform.
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